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The Vagrancy Concept
By ROLLIN M. PERmrNst
Idleness per se
Suppose a few survivors of a shipwreck on the high seas should manage
to reach an uninhabited island where conditions are so rigorous that only
by the utmost effort of all can food and shelter sufficient for survival be
provided. If under those conditions one able-bodied man should refuse to
do his share of the work for no reason other than his preference to be idle,
he would promptly be confronted with the edict: "He who refuses to work
shall not eat." And this restriction would be imposed by the others with
no thought of taking an advantage because of superior numbers, but with
righteous indignation, because to them unnecessary idleness would loom as
an offense of the highest degree. And this, except for the extremity of the
position, seems to have been the ancient attitude toward indolence in gen-
eral. Thus, it was said at one time: "In China it is a maxim that if there
be a man who does not work, or a woman that is idle, in the empire, some-
body must suffer cold or hunger, the produce of the lands not being more
than sufficient, with culture, to maintain the inhabitants, and, therefore,
though the idle person may shift off the want from himself, yet in the end
it must fall somewhere."1 And in ancient Athens idleness per se was a pun-
ishable offense.2 The exact placement of such a rule of law in our own back-
ground is far from easy, although Blackstone indicates its presence there
somewhere.3 Certain it is that when the feudal system was at its height
there were ways by which a reluctant able-bodied serf could be coerced to
work; and the influence of economic necessity, although in slightly modi-
fied form, is plainly reflected in the ancient Statute of Labourers,4 which
required an able-bodied person under the age of sixty, without means of
support, to serve anyone who required his service or else be imprisoned,
and prohibited the giving of alms to any able-bodied beggar to the end that
he would find it necessary to work for a living.
Under present circumstances in this country, the idleness of one person
does not necessarily mean that anyone must suffer cold or hunger. Conceiv-
ably, with increased reliance upon automation, the point may be reached
t Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of Law; Connell Professor
of Law Emeritus, University of California School of Law, Los Angeles, California. Admitted
to practice, California, Kansas, Iowa, Tennessee.
14 BL. Comm. *169.
2 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
4 23 EDw. 3 (1349). That is, he was to be committed to jail until he should find surety
that he would serve.
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where everyone may expect to receive the necessities of life, and some of
the modest comforts, as a matter of course,--work being required only by
those whose ambitions require much more. It is also conceivable, although
by no means certain, that so mild a climate might permit heights of culture
not otherwise attainable. All speculations along such lines must be left to
others. The present study is not limited to idleness but the social signifi-
cance of idleness under changing economic conditions and moral standards
will serve as a useful background.
The starting point under the ancient theory that unless every able-
bodied person did his share of the work someone must suffer deprivation,
although it might not be the indolent himself, seems to have been to deal
with idleness per se as an offense; but if so, that position was abandoned
at a very early day.5 There have been times within our memory when the
rigors of war-time conditions made an all-out effort so essential that the
word "slacker" was applied as an opprobrious epithet to one who failed to
do his part. And if a full-scale atomic war should come the conditions in
areas of survival might be so extreme as to require re-enactment of the
ancient position that idleness is per se a crime. We can only hope that no
such condition will ever be imposed upon us. As of the moment, so far as
our heritage is concerned, the concept of idleness per se as a crime had dis-
appeared before it had an opportunity to be molded into the common law.'
The careless wording of some of the modern statutes might lead to the
conclusion that punishment was thereby provided for idleness in and of
itself alone. For example, prior to the 1955 amendment, which omitted the
word "idle," 7 the California Penal Code' included as one of the categories
5 It may be that some of the early colonial statutes provided for the punishment of idle-
ness per se. For example: "As early as 1633 . . .the magistrates dealt with those who spent
their time 'idly and unprofitably'." Commonwealth v. Diamond, 248 Mass. 511, 514, 143 N.E.
503, 504 (1924). But in this connection it must be borne in mind that if a lawyer of the twenty-
second century should have only fragmentary references available he may come to the con-
clusion that this had also been true under some of the statutes of today.
6 "Idleness in any person whatsoever is also a high offence against the public economy,"
said Blackstone (4 BL. CoMm. *169), but he was inadvertently picturing the law of an earlier
day because it had been established before the commentaries were written that idleness per se
was not a common-law offense. The Queen v. Branworth, 6 Mod. 240, 87 Eng. Rep. 989 (1704).
In fact, Blackstone himself, in the rest of the paragraph following the sentence quoted above,
shows that something more than idleness alone was needed for punishment.
"As a result of the historical conditions . . . the English law lost sight of the criminality
of those who remained in their own parish, able to work but refusing to do so, and living on
the county." Lisle, Vagrancy Law, Its Faults and Their Remedy, 5 J. CRIa. L. & C. 498, 499-
500 (1914).
7 The amendment made other changes also in subdivision 5, wording it as follows: "Every




of punishable vagrancy: "Every idle, or lewd, or dissolute person, or asso-
ciate of known thieves ... ." Had the question been raised prior to the
amendment, the court might have held the true meaning of the statute to be
something less than it seemed to say, because: "The purpose of this legis-
lation must necessarily be read into the statute whenever applied to a given
case-a fundamental rule of statutory construction."9 Possibly it might
have adopted some such technique as was used by the North Carolina court
many years ago, when it construed a somewhat differently-worded statute
so as not to punish idleness per se, by holding that the word "or" must be
read as "and."'1 A California court had pointed out obiter that it is beyond
the power of the legislature to denounce mere inaction as a crime without
some qualification," and no doubt would have followed this with an express
holding to this effect, had it been forced to take such a position,-as did
the West Virginia court under an enactment that left no room for "inter-
pretation."'2
The Tramp
Withdrawal of idleness from the category of conduct punishable per se
did not establish it as socially acceptable or bring it into favor in any way,
but left it on the borderland of crime, as clearly indicated by several devel-
opments. The habits and customs of travel in the early days of English life
were altogether different from what they are here (or there) at the present
time. For the most part, the inhabitant had a fixed place of abode and ordi-
narily remained in the community in which he lived unless some very good
reason took him elsewhere; and if he did have occasion to travel he ex-
pected to be asked questions and was quite ready and willing to give the
proper explanation. Hence the furtive stranger who by idleness and inabil-
ity or unwillingness was unable to show any good reason for his presence
was quite reasonably suspected of being there for some improper purpose.
To be sure, such a person was usually obnoxious for some additional reason
9 Ames, A Reply to "Who Is a Vagrant in California?", 23 CAras. L. REv. 616, 618 (1935).
30 State v. Custer, 65 N.C. 339 (1871).
I In re McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 96 Pac. 110 (1910). The reference was quoted with ap-
proval in State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 232, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933).
1 2 An act passed as a war-time measure, to be effective only during the war and for six
months thereafter, required that every able-bodied male resident between the ages of sixteen
and sixty should regularly and steadily engage for at least thirty-six hours per week in some
lawful and recognized business, profession, occupation or employment, except bona-fide stu-
dents in school, and failure so to perform, regardless of financial ability was made a misde-
meanor. This was held to be an unreasonable restraint upon personal liberty, as having no just
or reasonable relation to things generally comprehended within the police power of the state,
and hence unconstitutional. Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W.Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
The Delaware court upheld a similar statute as an emergency war-time measure. State v.
McClure, 7 Boyce 265, 105 Adt. 712 (1919).
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such as being a professional beggar, a professional swindler or a profes-
sional gambler, but the earliest use of the term "vagrant" or "vagabond"
to indicate one whose mode of life was offensive to the community seems
to have had reference to one best described as a "tramp."'1 3 Such persons
were the "vagabonds whom our antient statutes describe to be 'such as
wake on the night and sleep on the day, and haunt customable taverns and
ale-houses, and routs about [i.e., go here, there and everywhere], and no
man wot from whence they came nor whither they go' ... .M4
The concept of the "tramp" is frequently encountered in modern va-
grancy statutes,--sometimes as a category by itself, although frequently
coupled with some other socially-undesirable trait. When found as a single
category, it is sometimes worded in terms of one wandering about, sleeping
in barns, sheds or other unusual places or in the open air, and not giving a
good account of himself. 5 Examples of the other type occur in the statu-
tory references to one having no home in the community, who is found wan-
dering about without employment and without visible means of support,,
or to a "person who roams about from place to place without any lawful
business,' 17 or "who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours of
the night without any visible or lawful business."" It was held that the
words "visible or lawful business," as so employed, refer to the reason why
the person is roaming rather than to his occupation, and mean he is roaming
the streets at late hours without good or sufficient reason.' 9
Idle and Loose
In Branworth,20 two centuries and a half ago, after pointing out that
a vagrant or a vagabond was not indictable as such, it was added: "but if
13 "[T]he word vagrant in England . . . is roughly equivalent to tramp . .. ." Lisle,
Vagrancy Law; Its Faults and Their Remedies, 5 J. CRrm. L. & C. 498 (1914). "A 'vagrant' is
defined in CENTURY DICTiONARY as 'One who strolls from place to place, one who has no set-
tled habitation; an idle wanderer; an incorrigible rogue; a vagabond.'
"We know of no definition of a vagrant seriously at variance from those quoted." Ex parte
Oates, 91 Tex. Crim. 79, 238 S.W. 930, 931 (1921).
14 4 BL. Comv. *169; TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER 117 (1886); Ex parte Branch, 234 Mo.
466, 470, 137 S.W. 886, 887 (1911).
15 E.g., CONN. GEN. STATS. REV. § 644 (1949); D.C. CODE § 22-3302(6) (as amended,
1953); MINN. STATS. ANN. § 614.57 (West, 1947); NBR. REv. STATS. § 28-1119 (1956). Such
a provision is adapted from a clause in an early English statute. 17 GEo. 2, c. 25 (1744). Cf.
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 666 (1951).
16E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 881 (1953). The label in the Delaware Code is "tramp." The
Alabama Code includes as one category of vagrancy any person who wanders about in idle-
ness, who is able to work and has no property sufficient for his support. ALA. CODE., tit. 14, § 437
(1940).
17 E.g., Aasz. REv. STATS. AieN. § 13-991 (1956) ; HAWAII R v. LAWS § 11771 (1945).
18 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(6) (amended, 1955).
19 Ex parte McLaughlin, 16 Cal. App. 270, 116 Pac. 684 (1911) ; State v. Grenz, 26 Wash.2d
764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946).
20 The Queen v. Branworth, 6 Mod. 240, 87 Eng. Rep. 989 (1704).
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he is an idle and loose person, you may take him up as a vagrant... by the
common law; .. ." Certain words in this quotation invite attention. "Va-
grant" and "vagabond," although not derived from the same source,21 both
have in the background the idea of wandering about, which developed into
the notion of idle wandering, and this was the significance with which the
words were used by the court in holding conduct coming under such labels
not to be indictable as such. But in authorizing the officer to take up "an
idle and loose person" as a "vagrant," we find definite abandonment of the
idea of wandering as an indispensable ingredient of the latter concept,
although the possibility of its having a bearing thereon has never been
eliminated.22
The word "loose" also invites attention. As applied to a person, this
adjective refers to the absence of moral restraint as in the phrase "loose
woman," meaning one who is wanton or unchaste.3 Hence, while idleness
alone did not call for official interference at the start of the eighteenth cen-
tury, it was otherwise if lewdness was added thereto,24 and this combina-
tion is frequently branded as vagrancy under modern statutes, such as a
clause referring to a person leading an immoral or profligate life and having
no lawful employment. 5 "Looseness" alone is sufficient for vagrancy under
some of the modern statutes although usually expressed in other terms such
as by referring to a person who is lewd,26 interpreted to mean lustful, libi-
dinous, lascivious or unchaste;27 or "dissolute,128 interpreted to mean
"loosed from restraint, unashamed, lawless, loose in morals and conduct,
recklessly abandoned to sensual pleasures, profligate, wanton, lewd, de-
bauched";29 or "lewd, wanton and lascivious in speech or behavior. 80
Idle and Disorderly
Another illustration of the unfavorable attitude toward idleness is
found in instances in which it was coupled with disorderly conduct. The
2 1 
See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1951).
22 "Before a hawker, pedlar or the like can be deemed a vagrant, he must be wandering
abroad and out of his own parish." Anonymous, 11 Mod. 3, 88 Eng. Rep. 846 (1702). "The fol-
lowing persons are vagrants .... 5. A person wandering abroad... ." N.Y. CODE CR. PROC.
§ 887.
23 THE AamRcAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1947).
2 4 Acts during the period from 1644 to 1770 punished the "lewd, idle and disorderly.,
Commonwealth v. Diamond, 248 Mass. 511, 514, 143 N.E. 503, 504 (1924).
2 5 E.g., D.C. CODE § 22-3302 (amended, 1953).
26 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(5) (amended, 1955).
27 People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 330, 229 P.2d 843, 846 (1951).
2 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(5) (amended, 1955).
29 Quoted from WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY in People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 778, 783, 296 P.2d 601, 603 (1931). A narcotic addict is a dissolute person, "given over
to dissipation or vicious courses," and hence a vagrant. People v. Jaurequi, 142 Cal. App. 2d 556,
560, 298 P.2d 896, 900 (1956).
30 E.g., FLA. STATS. ANN. § 856.02 (1941) ; ILL. STATS. A-N. c.38, § 578 (Perm. ed.) ; ME.
Rav. STATS. c. 137, § 33 (1954).
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social interest in preserving the peace and tranquillity of the community
was recognized at a very early day,31 and any misconduct carried to such
an extent as to constitute a breach of the peace was punishable on that
basis."2 On the other hand, no such extreme was required for the character-
ization "disorderly conduct" which frequently indicated misbehavior of a
lesser degree." Thus, under the old English law, while idleness alone was
not sufficient to authorize commitment as a vagrant 4 and neither was dis-
orderly conduct alone,35 it was otherwise when the two were found in com-
bination.8 6 "Idle and disorderly persons, vagrants, are terms often occur-
ring in the old statutes. They have been from time immemorial, in England,
subject to the summary jurisdiction of justices of the peace."37
Under some of our statutes, the phrase "idle and disorderly persons"
is employed to designate one of many categories of vagrants. 8 In England,
the 1744 amendment to the Vagabond Act39 divided vagrants into three
classes, with different penalties, the labels being: (1) idle and disorderly
persons, (2) rogues and vagabonds, and (3) incorrigible rogues. Under this
classification, the phrase "idle and disorderly persons" was arbitrarily ex-
panded to include some categories not logically within the meaning, such
as "all persons who threaten to run away and leave their wives and children
to the parish."4 This artificial expansion of the phrase "idle and disorder-
ly" has had some recognition in this country.4' The logical step, taken in
some states, has been to omit the word "idle" from the label. In Michigan,42
31 The early indictments, for example, all included some such phrase as "against the peace
and dignity of the King." Rawlins v. Ellis, 16 M.&W. 172, 173, 153 Eng. Rep. 1147, 1148 (1846).
3 2 An act which tends to a breach of the peace is indictable. The King v. Summers, 3 Salk.
194, 91 Eng. Rep. 772, 1 Lev. 139, 83 Eng. Rep. 337 (1664).
33 Rex v. Miller, 2 Stra. 1103, 93 Eng. Rep. 1059 (1738). "Evidence of the habitual use of
profane language is evidence of disorderly conduct." Commonwealth v. Murray, 80 Mass. 397,
398 (1860).
34 The Queen v. Branworth, 6 Mod. 240, 87 Eng. Rep. 989 (1704).
35 Rex v. Miller, 2 Stra. 1103, 93 Eng. Rep. 1059 (1738).
36 The King v. Talbot, 11 Mod. 415, 88 Eng. Rep. 1122 (1730). The case refers to the
statute of 7 JAC. 1 (1609), but it is not clear whether this enactment was necessary for con-
viction or merely made specific provision for the punishment. It is not necessary to make this
determination for the present discussion. In fact, this old statute itself refers to former "laws
and statutes" on the subject.
37 State v. Maxey, 1 Mc Mul. 501, 503 (S.C. 1837).
38 E.g., FLA. STATS. ANN. § 856.02 (1941); ME. REv. STATS. c. 137, § 41 (1954).
89 17 GEo. 2, c. 5 (1744). See also 5 GEo. 4, c. 83 (1824).
40 Ibid. It does not stretch the word "disorderly" to apply it to one making such a threat,
but the threatener might not be "idle" in any sense of the word. One who actually deserted his
wife and children so that they became chargeable to the parish was declared to be a rogue and
vagabond under class 2.
41 See, for example, Commonwealth v. Diamond, 248 Mass. 511, 143 N.E. 503 (1924).
42 Micir. STATS. ANx. § 28.364 (amended, 1939). See also N.Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 899.
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for example, the provision is in substance: "Any person" with mention of
several different categories specifically including "any vagrant" "shall be
deemed a disorderly person."
While not with its usual significance, the term "disorderly conduct"
may be employed in a particular instance to refer to a breach of the peace,
and if so used the reference is ordinarily to an offense other than vagrancy.4"
Needless to add, what otherwise would constitute vagrancy does not cease
to be such because the conduct is so extreme as to result also in some dis-
tinct offense."
Idle and "'Worthless'"
The adjective "worthless," when applied to a person at the present time,
usually carries the implication that he is "good for nothing" in the sense
that he lacks either the ability or the determination to accomplish anything
really worth while. In an earlier day, however, this term was applied very
literally to indicate the lack of worldly goods. For one having adequate
means for his support to idle away his time without engaging in any gainful
occupation or calling was understandable (except in very ancient times),
although it did not meet with wholehearted approval; but such a mode of
life by one without means was quite a different matter. His ability to get
along without any "visible means of support" gave rise to the very logical
suspicion that he had sources of income which were unlawful and hence
must be kept "invisible."
The earliest reference to this category, although it may have been mere
codification of existing law, seems to have been in 1349, when the Statute
of Labourers45 provided for the imprisonment of an able-bodied male under
sixty, without means of support, who refused to work. It is found fre-
quently in modern statutes on vagrancy.46 The statutes are not worded alike
but designate this category by such phrases as "able-bodied persons with-
out visible lawful means of support who do not seek employment," 47 or
"being without visible means of support shall refuse to work when work
at fair wages is to be procured in the community,"48 or a person who "lives
in idleness, who is able to work, and has no property sufficient for his
support.;
49
43 B.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 415 (Deering, 1949). This section uses the phrase "disturbs the
peace" but the primary reference in the index is "disorderly conduct."
44 Faulkner v. State, 146 Fla. 769, 1 So.2d 857 (1941).
45 23 EDW. 3 (1349).
46B.g., ALASKA Comn'. LAWS AN. § 65-13-21 (1949); AmZ. REv. STATS. ANN. § 13-991
(1956) ; ARK. STATS. ANN. § 41-4301 (Off. 1947) ; Coo. STATS. ANN. c. 48, § 281 (1935) ; N.Y.
CODE CR. PROC. § 887.
4 7 R.g., LA. REV. STATS. § 14:107 (amended, 1952).
4 8 B.g., KANs. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 21-2409 (1949).
4 9 E.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 437 (1940).
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Under some statutes, the idle-and-worthless concept is found in com-
bination with some other category, such as, "Persons known as tramps,
wandering or strolling about in idleness, who are able to work and have no
property to support them";" ° persons "who have no visible profession or
calling by which to maintain themselves, but who do so, for the most part
by gaming"; 51 or "all those idle and disorderly persons who either have no
visible means of living, or who pursue such means of gaining livelihood as
are dishonest or subversive of the peace and good order of society," such
as gambling. 2
The idle-and-worthless provision of the vagrancy law does not punish
poverty or destitution as such, nor does it punish one in bona-fide search
of work, even if in rags and filth.5" Obviously, moreover, idleness even by
one without means, is not punishable if work is impossible because of acci-
dent or disease.54 On the other hand, to refer to an extreme case, evidence
that defendant had no property, was able to work but had not worked for
two years, was sufficient for conviction of vagrancy.55 As explained by the
Georgia court:5 "If a man is able to work, but is idle and has no means
of support, there is a great temptation to steal, in order to relieve his hunger
and supply his bodily necessities. It is to keep him from this temptation
that the law commands him to work for his own support." And with refer-
ence to a statute which added the idea of "tramping or wandering around
from place to place" the Missouri court explained that the lack of support
makes idle wandering dangerous."
The Beggar-"Wandering" or "Sturdy"
One incapacitated by accident or disease and without means for his
support is an object of charity rather than punishment and has been so re-
garded from earliest times. At one period, he was encouraged to solicit alms
in order to lighten the burden of public charity; but on the theory that each
parish should care for its own he was not permitted to wander about beg-
5 0 E.g., Miss. CODE § 2666 (1942). Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-7001 (1953) ; Ky. REv. STATS.
§ 436.520 (1953); Mo. ANm. STATS. § 563.340 (1949).
5 1 E.g., N.Y. CODE CR. PROC. § 899.
52 State v. Maxey, 1 Mc Mul. 501 (S.C. 1837).
6
3 Ex Parte Karnstrom, 297 Mo. 384, 249 S.W. 595 (1923).
54 Walters v. State, 52 Ga. 574 (1874). Some types of vagrancy can be committed by one
unable to work, but they were not included in the indictment in this case.
55 Price v. State, 67 Ga. 723 (1881). See also Ex parte Tom Wong, 122 Cal. App. 672,
10 P.2d 797 (1932); State v. Cummins, 78 Ind. 251 (1881) ; Adamson v. Hoblitzell, 279 S.W.2d
759 (Ky. 1955).
As to what constitutes "visible means of support" compare Branch v. State, 73 Tex. Crim.
471, 165 S.W. 605 (1914) with Gentry v. Booneville, 194 Miss. 1, 24 So.2d 88 (1945).
56 Daniel v. State, 110 Ga. 915, 36 S.E. 293 (1900).
57 Ex parte Karnstrom, 297 Mo. 384, 249 S.W. 595 (1923).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9
ging in other parts of the country.1s During that period, the impotent beg-
gar was a vagrant only if he wandered abroad asking for charity outside
his own parish or "precinct."59 On the other hand, one who is quite capable
of earning his livelihood but turns to begging merely as a matter of choice
has always been looked upon with extreme disfavor and was a vagrant
whether he carried on his activity at home or "abroad."60 Such a one
has been designated by various labels such as "able-bodied beggar""' or
"healthy beggar" 62 or by some such specification as that the provision does
not apply "to any female or minor under the age of 16 years, nor to any
blind, deaf or dumb person, nor to any maimed or crippled person who is
unable to perform manual labor."63 The ancient designation, 4 still found
in some of the modern statutes, 5 is "sturdy beggar."
In the course of time the tendency to encourage local begging by help-
less indigents gave way to the theory of full public responsibility for such
persons, after which any professional beggar came to be recognized as a
vagrant;" and when vagrants were divided into classes with different de-
grees of punishment no distinction was made between the impotent and
the sturdy, but one who made a business of begging locally was called an
"idle and disorderly" person who should be imprisoned not to exceed one
month,6" while he who wandered out of his own parish for this purpose was
placed in the category of "rogues and vagabonds" with a penalty three
5 8 "Every beggar not able to work, shall report to the Hundred where he last dwelled, is
best known, or was born, and there remain . . . ." Vagabond Act, 11 HEN. 7, c. 2 (1494).
"The justices of the peace in every county ... shall give license under their seals to such
poor, aged and impotent persons to beg within a certain precinct, as they think to have most
need. And if any do beg without such license, or without his precinct, he shall be whipped, or
else set in the stocks three days and three nights, with bread and water only." .MOpTENT PooR
AcT, 22 HEN. 8, c. 12 (1530).
59 Ibid.
60 ccWandring abroad" was the ancient phrase to indicate one outside his own parish. E.g.,
VAGABoND AcT, 39 ELiz. 1, c. 3 (1597) ; 17 GEO. 2, c. 5 (1744). Such a beggar was "whipped,
and then sworn to return to the place where he was born, or last dwelt by the space of three
years, and there put himself to labour." IMPOTENT PooR AcT, 22 HEMN. 8, c. 12 (1530).
61LA. STATS. § 14:107 (amended, 1952). "Able-bodied male beggar." Ky. RV. STATS.
§ 204.060 (1953).
6 2 NEV. CoM,. LAws § 10302 (1929); ORE. Rxv. STATS. § 166.060 (1953).
6 3 PA. STATS. AarN. § 4617 (Purdon, 1945). "No person not being a female or blind. ...
Ozro CoDE ANN. § 2923.28 (Page, 1953). "Whoever, except a female or a blind person or a
cripple ... ." hrm. STATs. ANN. § 10-4603 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1956).
64
VAGABoND Acr, 39 Eraz. 1, c.4 (1597) ; id., 7 JAc. 1, c.4 (1609).
6 5 .g., S.C. CODE § 16-565 (1952).
66 Overseers of the poor were authorized to raise by taxation "such competent sums of
money for, and towards the necessary support of the lame, impotent, old, blind, and such other
among the poor, and not able to worke ... as to them shall seeme convenient .... And foras-
much as all begging is forbidden by this present act ... ." Poor Ria Acr, 39 Euz. 1, c. 3
(1597).
67 V. A OND Acr, 17 GEO. 2, C. 5 (1744).
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times as severe.68 The "rogue and vagabond" who repeated his offense after
prior conviction was included in the class of "incorrigible rogues" and sub-
ject to even greater penalty.69
The statutes in this country have significant differences in this regard
which can be expressed most easily by arbitrarily using the word "wander-
ing" to mean going about outside the county or city of residence (or by one
having no fixed place of abode), and "sturdy" to indicate the lack of any
disqualification based upon sex, age or physical disability. The references,
moreover, are to the practice of mendicancy and not to some isolated re-
quest for assistance.7" It is possible to find provisions which apply only to
a beggar who is sturdy and wandering. 7 Other statutes cover the sturdy
beggar wherever he carries on his activity,7 and still others apply to any
beggar.7"
Desertion of Wife or Child
A man has a common-law duty to support and protect his wife74 and
any child of his too young to supply his own needs;75 but while the duty is
well recognized the breach thereof does not bring him within the toils of
the law (in the absence of special statute) ,76 unless some serious conse-
quence ensues.77 If death results from his malicious or criminally negligent
failure to give such needed support, he is guilty of criminal homicide,7" and
68 "[All persons wandering abroad and begging, shall be deemed rogues and vagabonds
." Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 People v. Denby, 108 Cal. 54, 40 Pac. 1051 (1895).
71 "Any person, other than one who is blind, or unable to do manual labor, or other than
one asking charity within the county in which he has a known place of residence for six months
next preceding . . . 2" ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 441 (1940). "Whoever, except a female or a blind
person or cripple, not being in the county in which he usually lives or has his home, is found
going about begging . . . ." ILL. STATS. ANN. § 10-4603 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). And see OHIo
CODE ANN. § 2923.28 (Page, 1953). The actual label in these statutes is "tramp," but a tramp
is a vagrant in the broad sense.
72 "Every healthy beggar who solicits alms as a business." ORE. Rav. STATS. § 166.060
(1953). See also ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 65-13-21 (1949) ; IDAHO CODE § 18-7101 (1947) ;
LA. RFV. STATS. § 14:107 (amended, 1952); MISS. CODE § 2666 (1942); NEv. Comp. LAWS
§ 10302 (1929) ; TEx. PEN. CODE art. 607 (Vernon, 1948). No attempt is made here, or else-
where in this article, to give exhaustive citations.
73 "Every beggar who solicits alms repeatedly or causes any child to do so ... ." HAWAII
REv. LAWS § 11771 (1945). See also FLA. STATS. ANN. § 856.02 (1941); IOWA CODE § 746.1
(1954) ; ME. REV. STATS. c. 137, § 33 (1954) ; Wis. STATS. § 947.02 (1955).
74 State v. Smith, 65 Me. 257 (1876) ; Territory v. Manton, 8 Mont. 95, 19 Pac. 387 (1888).
75 Regina v. Senior, 19 Cox C.C. 219 (1898) ; State v. Staples, 126 Minn. 396, 148 N.W.
283 (1914); Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. Co. Ct. 56 (1915); Rex v. Russell, [1933] ViCT.
L.R. 59 (1932).
7 6 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 270 (amended, 1957).
77 One who deserted his family was not a vagrant unless they became chargeable to the
parish. Rex v. Hall, 3 Burr. 1636, 97 Eng. Rep. 1022 (1765).
78 Regina v. Conde, 10 Cox C.C. 547 (1867).
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the English statute of 174411 branded him as a vagrant if his wife or child
became a public charge as a result of his wilful failure to make the neces-
sary provision. This type of misconduct is included in some of our vagrancy
statutes,80 while in other codes it is dealt with as a separate offense.8 ' The
fact that his wife or child is in a destitute condition does not make a man
a vagrant under such a provision if he is without means and incapacitated.82
The Common Drunkard-and Others
The "common drunkard" was punishable at common law 3 and, al-
though under the original theory his guilt was on the basis of a public nuis-
ance 4 rather than of vagrancy, this type of misconduct fits so logically into
the latter concept that it is found in many of our statutes.8 5 For a similar
reason, some of these enactments include also the "common brawler, 8 6
although the common law dealt with him also on a nuisance basis.8 7 Like-
wise included within the original public-nuisance concept was the "com-
mon scold,"88 who was punished by ducking,8 9 and this seems to be the type
of misconduct indicated by the occasional statutory reference to the "com-
mon railer."9
The tendency to add to the vagrancy statutes such well-known common-
law offenders as the "common drunkard," and so forth, probably accounts
for the frequent inclusion of such designations as the "common prosti-
7 9 VAGABoND AcT, 17 GEO. 2, c. 5 (1744).
8 0 .g., ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 437 (1940) ; MnN. STATS. ANN. § 614.57 (West, 1947) ; N.Y.
CoDE Cam. PRoc. § 899; Crawley v. State, 146 Ala. 145, 41 So. 175 (1906) ; McRae v. State,
104 Miss. 861, 61 So. 977 (1913).
8 1 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 270, 270a (amended, 1957). See also § 271a.
82 Boulo v. State, 49 Ala. 22 (1873).
83 Drunkenness was not of itself an offense under the common law of England but was
punishable in the ecclesiastical courts. 2 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CmiAL LAW op ENG-
iAND 410 (1883). Drunkenness by an idle person was sufficient for his commitment as a va-
grant. See Rex v. Miller, 2 Stra. 1103, 93 Eng. Rep. 1059 (1738).
842 WHARTON, CpmmNAL LAw § 1720 (12th ed. 1932). And see Moser v. Fulk, 237 N.C.
302, 306, 74 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1953).
85 B.g., ARiz. REv. STATS. ANN. § 13-991 (1956) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 647 (amended, 1955);
CoNN. GEN. STATS. REV. § 8644 (1949) ; FLA. STATS. ANN. § 856.02 (1941) ; IDAHO CODE § 18-
7101 (1947) ; Lmx. STATS. ANN. c. 38, § 578 (Perm. ed.) ; IowA CoDE § 746.1 (1954) ; MONT.
REV. CODE § 94-35-248 (1947); WASH. RFv. CODE § 9.87.010 (1951) ; Morales v. State, 85 So.2d
153 (Ala. App. 1956) ; State v. Burgess, 123 Me. 393, 123 Ati. 178 (1924) ; State v. Flynn,
16 RI. 10, 11 Atl. 170 (1887).
86..g., FLA. STATS. ANN. § 856.02 (1941); Iii. STATS. ANN. c. 38, § 578 (Perm. ed.); MAss.
ANN. LAWS c. 272, § 53 (Michie, 1956) ; State v. Burgess, 123 Me. 393, 123 Atl. 178 (1924).
87 2 WHARTON, CRnMNAL LAw § 1715 (12th ed. 1932).
8 8 Id. at § 1716.
8 9 Regina v. Foxby, 6 Mod. 11, 87 Eng. Rep. 776 (1703).
90 E.g., FLA. STATS. ANN. § 856.02 (1941) ; Ixr. STATS. ANN. c. 38, § 578 (Perm. ed.) ; M..
ANN. LAws c. 272, § 53 (Michie, 1956) ; State v. Burgess, 123 Me. 393, 123 AUt. 178 (1924).
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tute,"91 the "common gambler,"" the professional fortune-teller," or the
drug addict." Frequently, such additions are quite unnecessary as where
the same vagrancy statute includes a lewd person in one category and a
common prostitute in another. 5
The Anomalous Vagrant
With one exception, all types of misconduct mentioned up to this point
have reference to a mode of living or to habits of action as distinguished
from some isolated misdeed. This exception was found in the phrase in-
cluded in the English Act of 1744" -"all persons who threaten to run away
and leave their wives and children to the parish." Without more, this pro-
vision in a vagrancy statute might be interpreted to have reference to re-
peated threats under the doctrine of ejusdem generis,97 but this is made
doubtful by the clause following the one quoted above. This branded as
vagrants "all persons who shall unlawfully return to such parish or place
from whence they have been legally removed." And a few years later a stat-
ute9" added the possession of burglar's tools with intent to commit burglary
91 E.g., ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 437 (1940) ; CAL. PEN. CODE § 647 (amended, 1955) ; IDAHo
CODE § 18-7101 (1947); IOWA CODE § 746.1 (1954) ; MCic. STATS. ANN. § 28.364 (amended,
1939) ; MISS. CODE § 2666 (1942) ; MONT. REV. CODES § 94-35-248 (1947) ; N.Y. CODE CRIu.
PRoc. § 887; TEX. PEN. CODE art. 607 (Vernon, 1948).
The Massachusetts statute includes "common night walkers, both male and female." MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 272, § 53 (Michie, 1956).
9 2 E.g., Miss. CODE § 2666 (1942) ; TEx. PEN. CODE, art. 607 (Vernon, 1948). "Professional
gambler," ALA. CODE, it. 14, § 437 (1940); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-7001 (1953); WIS. STATS.
§ 947.02 (1955). "Habitual gamesters," IOWA CODE § 746.1 (1954).
93 N.Y. CODE CR.. PROC. § 899; S.C. CODE § 16-565 (1952) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 9.87.010
(1951) ; Wis. STATS. § 947.02 (1955). "All companies of gypsies, who, in whole or in part, main-
tain themselves by telling fortunes." TEX. PEN. CODE art. 607 (Vernon, 1948).
94 E.g., WASH. RFv. CODE § 9.87.010 (1951).
95 E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(5), (10) (amended, 1955). The "common" designation was
not unknown to the English law of vagrancy. Thus, in an early case it was pointed out that
while a vagrant was not indictable as such under the law of that time, yet if he repeated after
once having been judged a vagrant he could "be indicted as a common vagrant." The Queen
v. Branworth, 6 Mod. 240, 87 Eng. Rep. 989 (1704).
9 6 
VAGABOND AcT, 17 GEO. 2, c. 5 (1744).
97 A vagrancy statute including as one category anyone "who unlawfully sells or barters
any spirituous, vinous or malt or other intoxicating liquors," was interpreted to mean a prac-
tice of selling rather than one isolated sale. Williams v. State, 27 Ala. App. 540, 176 So. 312,
cert. denied, 234 Ala. 545, 176 So. 314 (1937).
98 "That if any person or persons shall ... be apprehended having upon him, her, or them,
any pick-lock, key, crow, jack, bit or other implement, with intent feloniously to break and
enter into any dwelling house, warehouse, coach-house, stable or outhouse, or shall have upon
him, her, or them, any pistol, hangar, cutlass, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon, with intent
feloniously to assault any person or persons, or shall be found in or upon any dwelling house,
warehouse, coach-house, stable or outhouse, or in any inclosed yard or garden, or area belong-
ing to any house, with intent to steal any goods or chattels, every such person or persons shall
be deemed a rogue and vagabond ... " VAGABOND AcT, 23 GEO. 3, c. 88 (1783).
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and possession of a weapon with intent to commit felonious assault, with
obviously no requirement of such possession on more than one occasion.
The vagrancy statutes in this country sometimes include one or more
clauses that seem to proscribe a single misdeed, such as the following: "Per-
sons who threaten to run away and leave their wives or children a burden
upon the public; ,,' every "person who annoys or molests any child under
the age of 18"; 100 "any person who shall be found jostling or roughly crowd-
ing people unnecessarily in a public place"; 10 1 every "person who uses
abusive or obscene language in any street, highway," and so forth; 102 or
all "persons playing or betting in any public street or public or open place,"
and so forth.0 3 It is dearly within the legislative power to provide for the
punishment of such misdeeds and the application of an inappropriate label
will not affect the validity of such a statute. Some of these clauses may be
held to have a different meaning, but it is clear that for conviction under
certain clauses of some vagrancy statutes "a single act is sufficient."""
A single misdeed, by its very nature0 5 or the method of its perform-
ance 16 may be convincing proof of a prohibited mode of living. This is a
mere matter of evidence0 7 and beyond the scope of the present undertak-
ing. The important point for the moment is that while a single act may be
punishable, in and of itself, under the name of "vagrancy" this is quite
anomalous. It is not vagrancy proper'108 and has no place in the "vagrancy
concept" here being considered. The present reference is solely for the
purpose of exclusion.
99 N.Y. CODE CaR. PRoc. § 899.
100 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647a (amended, 1957). And see ARiz. Rsv. STATs. A/ .§ 13-991
(1956). As to what constitutes annoyance or molestation under the statute, see People v. Moore,
137 Cal. App. 2d 197, 290 P.2d 40 (1955); People v. McNair, 130 Cal. App. 2d 696, 279 P.2d
800 (1955).
101 MC H. STATS. ANN. § 28.364 (amended, 1939).
102 ORE. RFv. STATS. § 166.060 (1953).
103 IOWA CODE § 746.1 (1954).
104 State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 234, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933).
105 See People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App. Supp. 778, 296 Pac, 601 (1931).
106 If a man is approached on the street by a strange woman who solicits him to have
sexual intercourse for pay this might be the first such attempt she had ever made. On the other
hand, the method of the approach might clearly demonstrate experience. See People v. Phelps,
189 App. Div. 775, 179 N.Y. Supp. 289 (1919).
107 "In other instances, however, the act may be the index of a chronic condition." State
v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 234, 24 P.2d 601, 604 (1933). "Conceding that vagrancy is chronic
rather than acute ... yet we think the existence of such a chronic condition may be ascertained
from a single examination, if the characteristic reactions of that condition be found present."
People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App. Supp. 778, 783, 296 Pac. 601, 603 (1931).
108 A person found guilty under a clause of vagrancy statute providing a penalty for a
single misdeed "is not thereby convicted of vagrancy, even though the two classes of offenses
are defined in the same act and punished with the same penalties." The King v. Lull, 8 Hawaii
199,200 (1891).
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The Purpose of Vagrancy Laws
The purpose of vagrancy laws, it has been said at times, is preventive
rather than punitive." 9 An analogy may serve as a useful introduction to
this part of the problem. A threat to do personal injury at some future
time is not an assault," and in the absence of some special statute it does
not subject the threatener to punishment; but if there is reason to believe
the threat may be carried out, this may be sufficient to require him to put
up a bond to keep the peace."' An arrest on a charge of a threat to do future
harm is not an arrest for crime but to bind the arrestee to keep the peace,1
and the "binding over" is not punishment either at common law or under
the statute."
The ancient theory of vagrancy was closely analogous to that of the
requirement of a peace bond by one who had threatened to do harm to
person or to property. Let attention be directed to the court's explanation
in 1704, that "if he is an idle and loose person, you may take him up as a
vagrant, and bind him to his good behaviour by the common law";114 and
to the statutory provision" 5 enacted some centuries earlier under which an
able-bodied worthless person who refused an offer of employment could be
imprisoned until he gave assurance that he would work by putting up a
bond to that effect with an acceptable surety. Neither of these had refer-
ence to misconduct which was to be punished as an offense because posting
of the required bond would end the matter if there was no violation of the
conditions therein stipulated. The statute had back of it the incentive of
economic necessity, as mentioned above, but the man of means was free to
refuse to work if he so desired. The primary purpose of this provision of
the statute was to require the man without means to work for a living rather
than to gain subsistence by begging, but another possibility may not have
been overlooked entirely. If the man without means found it difficult to
obtain all he desired by begging he might be tempted to try methods even
more antisocial in their nature, hence the enforcement of this statute may
well have had a tendency to prevent crime.
The common-law rule mentioned calls for a similar comment. In 1704
109 Vagrancy statutes, "being in the exercise of the police power, are generally looked upon
as regulatory measures to prevent crime rather than as ordinary criminal laws which prohibit
and punish certain acts as crimes." People v. Belcastro, 256 fl1. 144, 148, 190 N.E. 301, 303
(1934).
11o See People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 525 (1880).
"'l E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 701-706 (Deering, 1949) ; IowA CODE §§ 760.1-760.5 (1954).
112 Ritchey v. Davis, 11 Iowa 124 (1860).
113 Herz v. Hamilton, 198 Iowa 154, 197 N.W. 53 (1924).
Ill The Queen v. Branworth, 6 Mod. 240, 87 Eng. Rep. 989 (1704). The emphasis has been
changed.
11
5 STATUTE oF LABOuaERs, 23 EDW. 3 (1349).
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the "idle and loose" person was not punishable but was only one who could
be required to put up a bond to insure his good behavior. If the conduct of
an idle person was not held in bounds by moral restraint, it was very likely
to descend to the point of criminal activity if left to its own course, and
hence the bond was required.
The one required to give bond either under the statute or the common
law was subject to imprisonment if the bond was not forthcoming. Since
giving the required bond was frequently impossible, the practical effect of
the enforcement of such laws may have seemed very punitive to those
caught in the web, but the theory was prevention of crime rather than its
punishment.
It was said by the Iowa court during the present century: "Vagrancy
is not made punishable under the statute, which provides only for security
against the commission of an offense."" 6 This, however, represents practi-
cally the last stronghold of the ancient theory of vagrancy,17 because most
of the other statutes provide for a fine or imprisonment or both.:" Insofar
as the legal theory is concerned the notion that vagrancy laws are not puni-
tive in their nature is only an echo from an ancient position that has almost
entirely disappeared at the present time.
The actual enforcement of the law by some particular police depart-
ment is quite a different matter, although that cannot be considered in
detail here since it has had substantial attention elsewhere" 9 and does not
bear directly upon the present problem. If a department has a policy of
116 State v. Dailey, 127 Iowa 652, 103 N.W. 1008 (1905).
117 "If it appear by the confession of such person, or by competent testimony that the
person arrested is a vagrant, the magistrate may require an undertaking with sufficient surety,
for good behaviour for the term of one year thereafter." IowA CODE § 746.8 (1954). See also
N.Y. CODE CM .PROC. §§ 901, 902. The bond for good behavior is sometimes authorized in
lieu of conviction, in the discretion of the magistrate. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 272, § 57
(1956) ; VA. CODE § 63-339 (1950).
In discussing the South Carolina statute of an earlier day, it was pointed out that one con-
victed of vagrancy was required to give security for good behavior for twelve months and on
failure thereof to be committed. State v. Maxey, 1 Mc Mul. 501 (S.C. 1837).
USSee the statutes of other jurisdictions cited supra. It is surprising that the ancient theory
of vagrancy had any recognition in this country, because early English statutes had provided for
the punishment of vagrancy as an offense. For example: An impotent beggar who wandered
abroad and engaged in begging outside his "precinct" was to be whipped or placed in the stocks
for three days and nights on bread and water. ImsoTENT POOR Acr, 22 HEN. 8, c. 12 (1530).
Repealed by 14 ELrz. 1, c. 5 (1572). A more severe penalty was provided by the VAGABOND
Acr, 14 Euiz. 1, c. 5 (1572). Repealed, 39 Euz. 1, c. 4 (1597). And what is perhaps the best
known of all the Vagabond Acts divided vagrants into three classes with different degrees of
punishment. 17 GEo. 2, c. 5 (1744). Since this act, at least, there seems to have been no basis
for considering vagrancy not to have been an offense in England.
119 E.g., Hall, Law of Arrest in Relation to Social Problems, 3 U. oF Cmr. L. Rxv. 345,
368-75 (1936). See the authorities cited by Professor Hall, and also, Note, Use of Vagrancy-
Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YAa LJ. 1351 (1950).
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"periodic sweeps" in which the effort is to pick up every known vagrant,"
the purpose undoubtedly is crime prevention. This moreover is not compar-
able to certain other law-enforcement "drives" such as a periodic "crack-
down" on traffic violators. The latter practice is not without a crime-pre-
ventive motive (present as a hope, at least, in all law enforcement) but the
purpose is to prevent traffic violations. The "periodic sweep" of vagrants,
on the other hand, is not merely to prevent vagrancy but to prevent a mul-
titude of other offenses that may be committed by such persons, and the
fact that such an effort achieves much less than is desired is not due to the
police but to the failure of the law to make any proper provision for those
taken into custody.'21 Without doubt, there have been abuses in the en-
forcement of the vagrancy law, 2 but in this connection we must "stop to
consider that all laws must be administered by human beings, with all the
frailties that flesh is heir to."'2 For the present, it must suffice to empha-
size that in playing the game of life the police officer and the law-abiding
citizen are members of the same team,-a fact sometimes forgotten by the
officer and all too frequently overlooked by the citizen. In metropolitan
centers, to change the metaphor, the vagrancy law is one of the most effec-
tive weapons in the arsenal of law enforcement," and if the officer's use
120 "Chief Frank Ahearn, who activated the policy in recent months of periodic sweeps on
undesirable characters and booking them as vagrants, has contended the program is effective.
"It has cut down crime, Ahern maintained." San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 9, 1957.
In regard to the suggestion that police policy should be the indiscriminate enforcement of
all laws at all times, it has been said: "For this purpose the ideal that all laws should be en-
forced without a discretionary selection is impossible to carry out. It is like directing a general
to attack the enemy on all fronts at once." Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social
Dissection, 42 YAr. L.J. 1, 9 (1932).
121 "A short term in the county workhouse where all kinds and conditions are huddled
pell-mell, with work of the meanest character, has no beneficial effect upon the shiftless."
"A central farm colony should be established for the detention of such vagrants, and to it
every vagrant should be committed. The commitment should not be for a definite term. The
necessity for an indeterminate sentence for all anti-social acts of an habitual nature is too well
recognized by legal medicine as well as modern criminology to need justification here." Lisle,
Vagrancy Law; Its Faults and Their Remedy, 5 J. CRmm. L. & C. 498, 511, 512 (1914).
122 "That our present vagrancy laws confer a dangerous discretionary power on police
officers has been clearly demonstrated within the last year. For example, the law is used during
industrial disputes, to arrest strikers and their leaders at strategic times and in strategic places;
in most cases charges are dismissed without any show of prosecution." Comment, "Who Is a
Vagrant in California?", 23 CA=nF. L. REv. 506 (1935). "In the Jackson case (memo. opinion,
p. 2) police officials testified to having arrested 375 men at one time, charging them with va-
grancy-most of the arrests being made in a union hall." Id. at 507, n.3.
123 Ames, A Reply to "Who Is a Vagrant in California?", 23 CAmIr. L. R:v. 616, 618
(1935).
124 "For example, the police reports for 1950 show that in San Francisco there were 6220
arrests for vagrancy out of 63,903 arrests (excluding traffic violations) ; in San Jose 1,679 out
of 28,293; and in Fresno 2,261 out of 24,503." Recent Decisions, 39 CA=F. L. REv. 579, 580
(1951).
"Total arrests for this period (1932-33, in Los Angeles) were 83,571 of which 15%
(12,876) were for vagrancy." Comment, 23 CALIF. L. Rnv. 506 (1935).
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of this weapon should be seriously impaired the security of the citizen
would be grievously weakened.
Also to be passed over with no more than mention here is the matter
of constitutionality. The statutes differ from state to state1 2 and vary any-
where from a short sentence 28 to an elaborate section with twenty or more
categories.1 27 An occasional category in some particular statute has been
stricken down as an unconstitutional invasion of the right of personal lib-
erty,1es or on the ground that it is void for vagueness. 2 9 For the most part,
however, the vagrancy acts have withstood attacks upon their validity.3 '
As said in one case: 131
"Society recognizes that vagrancy is a parasitic disease, which, if al-
lowed to spread, will sap the life of that upon which it feeds. To prevent
the spread of the disease, the carrier must be reached. In order to discour-
age and, if possible, to eradicate vagrancy, our Legislature has enacted a
statute defining vagrant persons and penalizing them according to its terms.
We see no reason why this cannot, or should not, be done as a valid exercise
of the police power."
At the same time, if a study should be made of all our penal codes to
determine which subject is in greatest need of thorough study and revision
there is a distinct possibility that vagrancy might be the one selected.
The Nature of Vagrancy
Vagrancy, it has been suggested at times, is not a crime because crime
is defined in terms of "act or omission," and vagrancy is said to be some-
thing else. An intermediate court in California actually took such a posi-
tion in one case.'3 The fault in this regard, however, lies in the definition
itself. Bishop pointed the way many years ago when he defined crime in
terms of a "wrong"' 33 rather than an "act or omission." The author would
125 For an analysis of the statutes, see Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal
Condition, 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 1203, 1207-9 (1953).
1 2 6 VT. STATS. REV. § 8444 (1947).
127 TEx. PEx. CODE art. 607 (Vernon, 1948).
=2 People v. Belcastro, 356 11. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934) ; Ex parte Smith, 135 Mo. 233,
36 S.V. 628 (1896).
12 9 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
130 The cases are discussed in Lacey, op. cit. supra at. 1219-23 n.125.
131 State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 233, 24 P.2d 601, 603 (1933). Quoted with approval
in People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 329, 229 P.2d 843, 846 (1951).
132 People v. Cook, appellate department of the Superior Court of the County of Los An-
geles in an unpublished opinion. Cited in People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 328, 229 P.2d
843, 845 n.1 (1951).
13 3 "A crime is any wrong which the government deems injurious to the public at large,
and punishes through a judicial proceeding in its own name." 1 Bisnop, Naw CansnAL LAW
§ 32 (8th ed. 1892).
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prefer the term "social harm"'34 for this purpose, but the significant point
for the moment is that the word "act," when used in the definition of crime,
is given a significance broad enough to cover whatever is needed. In other
respects, the word "act" is used "to denote an external manifestation of
the actor's will and does not include any of its results, even the most direct,
immediate and intended."' 35 But if crime is defined in terms of an "act" and
the particular reference is to murder, the victim of shooting having died
as a result thereof ten months after the shot was fired, the so-called "act of
killing" covered a ten-month period. We cannot exclude vagrancy from the
scope of crime merely by the presence of a word used with such elasticity
as that. Under the ancient theory, as pointed out above, the vagrant was
not punishable for crime but could be required only to put up a bond to
insure his good behavior; but the notion that vagrancy is not an offense
under the usual 36 statute of today is utterly without foundation.
37
Another position frequently encountered is that a vagrant is punished,
not for what he has done, but for being a particular kind of person. 38 "The
punishment provided by Section 647 is not for doing, but for being; for
being a vagrant."' 39 And despite the risk of having a discussion of the point
descend to the level of semantics there is real substance here which must
not be ignored. Without accepting the doctrine of predestination, it is neces-
sary to recognize that many a man has committed murder or burglary or
theft or some other crime because of being the kind of person he was in-
stead of one of entirely different character. And hence there is a definite
causal relation between his being that type of person and the punishment
inflicted upon him. It is not true in any sense, however, that his being that
kind of person rather than his misconduct was the reason for the punish-
ment.
134 The reasons are explained in the author's book on Criminal Law in which the definition
is: "A crime is any social harm defined and made punishable by law." Page 5 (1957).
135 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 2 (1934).
136 It is possible to find a statute based on the ancient theory. See supra note 117.
137 People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951). "It is the crime of vagrancy
that is denounced by section 7843 of the Code ... 2" Brannon v. State, 16 Ala. App. 259, 260,
76 So. 991, 992 (1917). "The common-law offense of vagrancy ... has been enlarged by stat-
ute . . . ." State v. Suman, 216 Minn. 293, 295, 12 N.W.2d 620, 621 (1943).
138 "Because vagrancy is a crime of being rather than of acting . . . " Lacey, Vagrancy
and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1215 (1953). "The offence
is being a vagrant." People v. Gray, 4 Park. Cr. 616, 617 (1860). "The offence or misconduct
which is thus made punishable consists in being a person of the character and behavior de-
scribed." Commonwealth v. Parker, 86 Mass. 313, 314 (1862). "The statute punishes being a
certain kind of person, not doing a certain overt act." Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 179 Mass.
533, 534, 61 N.E. 213, 214 (1901). "The offence of which he is now accused consists in his
having a character attached to him . . . namely the character of a common drunkard." State
v. Flynn, 16 R.I. 10, 11, 11 Atl. 170, 171 (1887).
189 People v. Allington, 103 Cal. App. 2d 911, 919, 229 P.2d 495, 500 (1951).
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To be approached with a similar introduction, because the underlying
idea is the same, is the frequently-encountered suggestion to the effect that
vagrancy is a crime of condition rather than one of action. 4 ° With special
reference to this offense, it has been said that "there are in our legal system
several crimes, the essential element of which consists not in proscribed
action or inaction, but in the accused's having a certain personal condition
or being a person of a specified character."'' Another form of expression
is that it is a crime of "status."'4 2
Reference to certain other offenses will be helpful at this point. As em-
phasized by Holmes :13 "A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is
true, but it is the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself,
just as a partnership, although constituted by a contract, is not the contract
but is a result of it." And after pointing out that a partnership may endure
for years, he added his famous comment that a conspiracy is a "partner-
ship in criminal purposes." Three holdings in the conspiracy cases of par-
ticular interest here are: (1) If the combination has continued after that
time, the fact that it was originally formed prior to the statute which makes
its purpose unlawful is no defense;' (2) if it has continued after a statute
has increased the penalty this added punishment may be inflicted upon the
conspirators; 4 5 and (3) the statute of limitations begins to run not from
the formation of the plot but from the termination thereof. 4 6 These results
are due to the fact that conspiracy is a continuing offense and in the ab-
sence of some special statutory restriction analogous holdings are to be
expected in case of any other crime having this same characteristic, of
which vagrancy proper is unquestionably one. It "is chronic, rather than
acute; ...
140 "Hence the statute denounces and makes punishable being in a condition of vagrancy
rather than ... the particulars of conduct enumerated in the statute as evidencing or charac-
terizing such condition." District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835-6 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
"It is a generally accepted principle that vagrancy is a present condition .... " People v.
Banwer, 22 N.Y.S. 2d 566, 569 (1940).
34 1 Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1203
(1953). The statement quoted can be supported on the ground that the condition is the actual
gist of vagrancy, but it is likely to convey the idea that neither action nor inaction is involved
-which is definitely not the fact.
142People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 229 P.2d 843 (1951); People v. Banwer, 22
N.Y.S.2d 566, 569 (1940); Titus v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 444, 261 S.W. 1029 (1924); Cox v.
State, 84 Tex. Crim. 49, 57, 205 S.W. 131, 134-5 (1918).
143 United States v. Kissell, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910).
144 Christianson v. United States, 226 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1955).
145 State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895 (1941).
146 United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (1910). If the statute requires an "overt act" for
conviction of conspiracy, the last provable "overt act" may be required to have been within
the period of limitations. People v. Hines, 284 N.Y. 93, 29 N.E.2d 483 (1940). And see Note,
29 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1470 (1954).
147 People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 47, 91 Pac. 997, 1000 (1907). See also Williams v. State,
27 Ala. App. 540, 541, 176 So. 312, 313, cert. denied, 234 Ala. 545, 176 So. 314 (1937) ; Ex parte
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It is appropriate to speak of a member of an unlawful combination
amounting to a conspiracy as being in the condition or "status" of a con-
spirator, but it would be quite incorrect to add that he had not done any-
thing. Even if the wrongful objective has not been accomplished he has
joined the conspiracy, which he could not do without an act 48 on his part
in the form of a manifestation of his agreement to participate,'49 although
his manifestation might be by either words or conduct. 50 This is not all,
but before going further it may be helpful to consider an analogy drawn
from the unlawful possession of "contraband."'
51
A superficial analysis might lead to the suggestion that one in prison for
the violation of such a law is being punished, not for anything he has done,
but for merely being such a possessor. Unless protected by an immunity
provision in the statute itself, one may be convicted for the violation of
such a law even if his possession was acquired prior to its enactment and
when such possession was lawful." 2 This seems to lend support to the state-
ment above but overlooks the law of "negative action."'153 The penalty in
such a case is imposed for "continuing to possess" the article "after the
enactment of the law."' 54 One having possession of "contraband" has a
legal duty to dispose of it prior to the effective date of the statute, and guilt
is based upon the wrongful omission to do what the law requires. This duty
to dispossess oneself of contraband continues as long as the forbidden arti-
cle is unlawfully possessed, and hence, prosecution will not be barred merely
because the statutory period of limitations has run since its original acqui-
sition. It is a continuing offense because the "act of omission" continues.
This all assumes "a willing and conscious possession,"' 15 5 because while
"unwitting possession" is a legally-recognized concept it is not included
within the proper interpretation of such a statute.'5 6
Tom Wong, 122 Cal. App. 672, 10 P.2d 797 (1932); State v. Suman, 216 Minn. 293, 295,
12 N.W.2d 620, 621 (1943).
148 Although "words" and "acts" are at times used in a mutually-exclusive sense to distin-
guish promise from fulfillment, an exertion of the will manifested in the form of speaking or
writing is an act. Perjury and libel are extreme illustrations.
149 Indispensability of the agreement sometimes leads to the error of referring to it, rather
than to the resulting confederation as the "gist of the crime." See Roll v. People, 132 Colo. 1,
284 P.2d 665 (1955) ; People v. Sears, 138 Cal. App. 2d 773, 292 P.2d 663 (1956).
150 Della Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957); Piracci v. State, 207 Md. 499,
115 A.2d 262 (1955).
151 E.g., "Whoever, without lawful authority, possesses" counterfeit dies for coins, and so
forth, shall be fined not over $5,000, or imprisoned not longer than 15 years, or both. 62 STAT.
709, 18 U.S.C. § 487 (1952).
152 Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
153 The author has discussed this part of the field in his book on Criminal Law 513-24
(1957).
1
54 Samuels v. McCurdy, at 193.
15 Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225 (1921).
156 Ibid. State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951).
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The indication above that joining the unlawful confederation is not all
the conspirator has done requires a similar explanation. Conspiracies are
punished because of the increased danger involved in group offenses. 157
One who otherwise might abandon a criminal design may feel bound to
carry on because it is a "partnership" rather than an individual plan.
Hence, each conspirator has a legal duty to withdraw and to give effective
notice of his withdrawal to his confederate or confederates, in order that
his "membership" may not induce the perpetration of the contemplated
crime.' His failure to withdraw and to give effective notice thereof is an
"act of omission" on his part which continues until this duty is performed
or the conspiracy is terminated in some other way.
A man "without visible means of support" who is quite capable of earn-
ing his livelihood at some honest trade or calling but does not do so or make
any effort to do so, is a vagrant under most of the statutes,159 if not all. In
a very real sense, one in jail because of a violation of this provision may
be said to have been convicted because of being "idle and worthless" to
use the ancient phrase; but the true analysis does not exclude legally-recog-
nized action on his part. One without other means of support has a legal
duty to provide for his subsistence by some lawful activity if able to do
so, 160 and if he does not he is punished because his failure of this legally-
required performance is an "act of omission." This is a continuing offense
because his legal duty to work continues as long as he is able to do so and
has no other lawful means of support, and every moment of culpable omis-
sion is a continuation of his legally-recognized "negative action." For this
reason, a prior conviction is no defense to a subsequent prosecution if his
"act of omission" has continued since that time.'"'
Some of the other categories of vagrancy have no reference to negative
action, such as a provision with reference to the "common drunkard" or
157 Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
158 If the unlawful plan is executed, a conspirator who did not himself take part in the
actual perpetration is as guilty as the other, even if he had changed his mind and attempted
unsuccessfully to give notice of withdrawal. People v. Ortiz, 63 Cal. App. 662, 219 Pac. 1024
(1923).
159 The actual label used in one statute may be "vagrant," while in another it is "tramp"
or "disorderly person," but these are all vagrancy statutes in the broad sense of the term.
160 "The obvious intent of the legislature was to compel individuals to engage in some
legitimate and gainful occupation from which they might maintain themselves, and thus remove
the temptations to lead a life of crime or become public charges." People v. Banwer, 22 N.Y.S.2d
566, 569 (Magistrate's Ct. 1940).
161 Under the statute, a man who abandons his wife or children without just cause, leaving
them without support or in danger of becoming a public charge, is to be punished as a vagrant.
It was held that the failure of defendant to support his child without just cause was punish-
able. The fact that he has been prosecuted and punished for this offense will not bar a subse-
quent prosecution if he continues to leave the child without support. McRae v. State, 104 Miss.
861, 61 So. 977 (1913).
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"habitual drunkard" which is so frequently included." 2 A single act of in-
toxication does not make a man a vagrant, it is true, but if he is incarcerated
for being habitually in this condition it would be absurd to say his punish-
ment is not because of anything he has done. And whether a particular
category of vagrancy is grounded upon negative action or iterative positive




A distinction is made between a "condition of vagrancy" and the "par-
ticulars of conduct ... characterizing such condition"; 6 and emphasis is
upon "a course of conduct"'" 5 rather than "a certain overt act,"' 60 but
although not always stated the necessary reference is to "misconduct"' 67
rather than to some condition in which the accused happens to have been
placed irrespective of any action or inaction on his part. 6 '
In other words, the gist of the offense of vagrancy is the condition or
"status" of being a vagrant, just as the gist of the offense of conspiracy is
membership in the unlawful combination and the gist of unlawful posses-
sion of contraband is the condition of being in such possession. Care should
be taken, however, to distinguish between the gist of the offense and the
reason for inflicting punishment, and whereas courts dealing with the other
two have taken pains to emphasize the element of misconduct,169 statements
in regard to vagrancy are often calculated to convey the idea that punish-
ment is irrespective of what the vagrant has done or failed to do.'
162 A "common drunkard" within the statute defining vagrancy is a person whose general
rule of life is that of drunkenness, sobriety being the exception. Morales v. State, 85 So.2d 153
(Ala. App. 1956).
163 "The offence ... consists in being a person of the character and behavior described."
Commonwealth v. Parker, 86 Mass. 313, 314 (1862). [Emphasis added.]
164 District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
165 People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App. 2d 326, 328, 229 P.2d 843, 845 (1951) ; State v. Suman,
216 Minn. 293, 295, 12 N.W.2d 620, 621 (1943) ; Ex parte Oates, 91 Tex. Cr. 79, 81, 238 S.W.
930, 931 (1921).
166 Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 179 Mass. 533, 534, 61 N.E. 213, 214 (1901). The offense
"not being a particular act, but a continued series of acts or habit of life... 2' Stratton v. Com-
monwealth, 51 Mass. 217, 221 (1845).
167 Commonwealth v. Parker, 86 Mass. 313, 314 (1862). Speaking of one category of va-
grancy, it has been said: "It seems that the criminality rests upon a combination of three cir-
cumstances: the absence of lawful means of support, the neglect to seek employment, and the
offensive public exhibition of such condition." FREUND, POLICE POWER § 99 (1904). Quoted
(loosely) with approval in Ex parte Branch, 234 Mo. 466, 470, 137 S.W. 886, 887 (1911).
168 "The idea conveyed by the word 'vagrant' or 'vagrancy' also had connected with it
and as a part of it ... one whose business, pursuit or occupation, or want of it, was vicious to
society .... ." Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 177, 191, 138 S.W. 759, 766 (1911). [Emphasis
added.)
169 E.g., Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225 (1921) ; State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d
617 (1951).
170 E.g., "The punishment ... is not for doing, but for being .... " People v. Allington,
103 Cal. App. 2d 911, 919, 229 P.2d 495, 500 (1951).
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A few cases illustrating the gist of vagrancy may be helpful. 171 Since the
gist of the offense is the condition or "status" of being a vagrant, the fact
that defendant meets the specifications of two different categories of the
statute does not make him two vagrants,172 while on the other hand two
persons though equally guilty cannot be the same vagrant. 172 For the same
reason, one may be convicted of being a vagrant here by proof of facts
which occurred beyond the jurisdiction.' 74 And if the statute authorizes
an officer without a warrant to arrest for any misdemeanor committed in
his presence he may on sight apprehend any vagrant known to him to be
such, even if no act manifesting the vagrancy is being committed at the
moment. 7 5 One known to the officer to be a common beggar (if this is
included in the statute) could be arrested on sight even if not then begging.
The condition of being a common beggar continues unabated during the
intervals between the actual solicitation of alms and hence this offense is
committed 176 in the presence of the officer if he is there. On the other hand,
where vagrancy is a misdemeanor as it usually is, the officer would need to
have a warrant for the arrest of a former vagrant who had reformed be-
cause in such case there would be no crime in the officer's presence at the
time of the arrest.
In contrast to these very sound holdings, based upon the gist of the
offense, is the occasional assumption, quite unsound and due to a failure to
distinguish between the gist of the offense and the reason for punishing
the offender, to the effect that one guilty of vagrancy cannot be punished
therefor except under a prosecution instituted while the condition of va-
grancy was still in existence: 177 in other words, that a vagrant has a com-
171 For a more elaborate discussion of the cases see Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of
Personal Condition, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1209-17 (1953).
172 Brannon v. State, 16 Ala. App. 259, 260, 76 So. 991, 992 (1917) ; People v. Allington,
103 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 911, 229 P.2d 495 (1951); Commonwealth v. Parker, 86 Mass. 313, 314
(1862). But see Campbell v. State, 31 Okla. Cr. 39, 43, 237 Pac. 133, 134 (1925). This was an
extreme case of a "drag-net" information charging a man with being a vagrant under each of
the eight subdivisions of the statute, including that of being a prostitute. For the same reason
an unlawful combination constitutes only one conspiracy even if it contemplates the commis-
sion of several offenses. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942) ; People v. Nasworthy,
94 Cal.App.2d 85, 210 P.2d 83 (1949).
173 District of Columbia v. Hunt, 163 F.2d 833, 835-6 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
174 People v. Lund, 137 Cal. App. 781, 27 P.2d 958 (1933) ; Cox v. State, 84 Tex. Crim.
49, 205 S.W. 131 (1918).
'75 People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907). "Vagrancy ... subjects the offender
to arrest at any time before he reforms." Id. at 47, 91 Pac. at 1000.
17 6 The verb "committed" is not appropriate to express the existence of a crime whose gist
is being in a certain condition but has been stretched to cover the situation because no other
is provided in the statutes on arrest. The "offense was committed2' People v. Babb, 103 Cal.
App. 2d 326, 328, 229 P.2d 843, 845 (1951).
17 7 The correct statement is that the vagrancy statute "can be applied only to the persons
who meet the description at the time the offense was committed." People v. Babb, supra
note 176.
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mon-law power to grant himself a fully-effective pardon by merely ceasing
to be a vagrant at any time before prosecution is actually started. This is
an inadvertent carryover from the earlier theory of vagrancy." When va-
grancy was not an offense, but merely a legal cause for requiring a bond for
good behavior, proof of reformation was sufficient to avoid the requirement
of the bond; but in criminal law it is basic that: "A crime once committed
may be pardoned, but it cannot be obliterated by repentance."' 79 The gist
of vagrancy is the condition or "status," it is true, but the reason for pun-
ishment is the misconduct which caused that condition and one who has
committed the crime of vagrancy can no more wipe out the fact of that
misconduct than he can "unring a bell."8
Although no lapse of time was a bar to a criminal prosecution at com-
mon law' 81 it has been the practice to provide otherwise as to almost every
offense by statute. It is clearly within the legislative power to provide a
special period of limitations for a crime in the nature of a condition by
providing that the prosecution therefor must be instituted while that con-
dition continues or not at all. So far as vagrancy itself is concerned, there
is much to be said in favor of such an enactment, and provisions to this
effect are not uncommon. 2 Such legislation is to be recommended, but the
178 See, for example, the quotations from the first type of statute mentioned in note 182
infra. Such wording has been held, quite properly, to provide a special period of limitation for
vagrancy prosecutions, but it is most unusual for this type of legislation. On the other hand,
such wording is exactly what would be expected in a statute whose purpose was not to provide
a penalty but to require the posting of a bond for good behavior.
179 State v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307, 317-8 (1883). One who has carried a criminal plan to the
point of a punishable attempt cannot wipe out the guilt of that attempt by an abandonment
of the effort. People v. Carter, 73 Cal. App. 495, 238 Pac. 1059 (1925) ; Glover v. Common-
wealth, 86 Va. 382, 386, 10 S.E. 420, 421 (1889).
180 "He would avoid the effect of the evidence of the events of February 22 by insisting
that those events had no place in his trial, because 'You must have positive evidence to prove
that a man is a dissolute and lewd person at the time of his arrest in order to justify prosecut-
ing him.' This, we are satisfied, is not the law." People v. Allington, 103 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
911, 913, 229 P.2d 495, 496 (1951).
1812 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CPEmi NAL LAW OF ENGLAND 1-2 (1883).
18 2 In New York, for example, the statute authorizes the magistrate to convict only if de-
fendant's confession or other evidence shows that "he is a vagrant." N.Y. CODE CRI. PROC.
§ 891. This wording is held, quite properly, to require the status of vagrancy to be in existence
at the time the complaint is lodged. People v. Banwer, 22 N.Y.S.2d 566, 569 (Magistrate's Ct.
1940); People v. Santiago, 79 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (1948); People v. Marcial, 110 N.Y.S.2d 361,
362 (1952).
The wording of the Texas code is as follows: "Any person coming within the definitions
and provisions of the foregoing Act (Vagrancy) shall be punished .... " TaX. PEN. CODE
art. 607a (1948).
"Each vagrant shall be fined not to exceed two hundred dollars." Id. at art. 608. Under
this wording also it was held that one cannot be convicted as a vagrant if he had ceased to be
in that category prior to the prosecution. Cox v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 49, 205 S.W. 131 (1918) ;
Levy v. State, 84 Tex. Crim. 493, 208 S.W. 667 (1919); Titus v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. 444,
261 S.W. 1029 (1924).
The wording of a number of the other statutes points in the same direction. For example:
assumption that a limitation of this nature is a necessary result because
vagrancy is a crime of condition rather than an isolated misdeed is quite
unsound and would be most unfortunate if extended to other crimes of con-
dition such as conspiracy or possession of "contraband."
From what has been said it is clear that the vagrancy concept cannot be
expressed adequately without reference to both the misconduct and the
resulting condition or "status." The exact boundaries of this condition, let
it be repeated, vary from state to state, but do not anywhere include the
"anomalous vagrant" even if found in the general vagrancy section be-
cause the gist of his offense is some particular misdeed. The following sug-
gestion is offered:
Vagrancy is a condition or "status" resulting from misconduct and in
the form of a socially-harmful mode of life which has been defined, and
now for the most part made punishable, by law.
"Such justice of the peace ... if satisfied that such person is a vagrant, may impose... :'
CoLO. STATS. AmT. c. 48, § 281. "It is unlawful to be a vagrant, and whoever is convicted of
being a vagrant shall be imprisoned not more than 10 days!' DEL. CODE Anix. § 11.882 (1953).
"Any person who is found in a state of vagrancy or practicing common begging shall, on con-
viction ... !I IND. STATS. ANx. § 10-4602 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). "Any person found guilty
... of being a vagrant, shall be punished ... 2' Wyo. ComrP. STATS. § 9-834 (1945).
Quite different wording is found in some of the statutes, such, for example, as: "Vagrancy
is a crime, and any person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars,
and may also be sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than twelve months."
ALA. CODE, tit. 14, § 438 (1940). "Whoever commits the crimes of vagrancy shall be fined not
more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned for not more than nine months, or both." LA.
REv. STATS. § 14:107 (1956, Pocket Part). "Whoever violates this section [tramps] shall be
imprisoned ... 2' Onto REv. CODE ANY. § 2923.28 (Page, 1954). "Any person found guilty of
any of these offences [vagrancy] shall be... 2' TENN. CODE ANNr. § 39-4702 (Off. ed. 1956).
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